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AN OVERVIEW: FROM CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITAL 
TO THE HISTORY OF CONTRADICTIONS OF THE WELFARE STATE
The development of welfare states should be explained not only as a factor 
of deindustrialization, social power resources, or economic competitiveness, 
but also as the consequence of Cold War confrontation, the post‑9 / 11 new 
world order, and more broadly the long-term geopolitical competition between 
modern societies. Contradictions inherent to capitalism are the driving forces 
of recent trends in international political economy. Drawing upon Harvey’s 
perspective, the aim of this article is to bind the contradictions of capital to 
the contradictions of the welfare state. While this does not entail suggesting 
these contradictions are of the same nature, it can be argued that the latter 
derives from the former. This perspective helps to integrate a global dimen-
sion into welfare state conceptualisation since the contradictions of capital 
are not only the product of state interrelations, but also reflect the interaction 
of market and society at the domestic and supra-national level. The purpose 
of this article is to apply Harvey’s framework on the contradictions of capital 
to the period in which they have most affected welfare state reform, and to 
establish a chronology of the contradictions of the welfare state. This will 
demonstrate how the welfare state has evolved in response to the paradoxes 
of capital. However, instead of resolving the tensions inherent in capitalism, 
the welfare state started developing contradictions of its own. A deeper 
understanding of the contradictions of welfare states is vital in assessing the 
dynamics of modern social policies, as it enables the policy-makers to better 
understand why these arrangements do not often meet public expectations.
Key words: Contradictions of capital; welfare state; Harvey; capitalism; 
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Introduction
Any analysis of the welfare state should begin with the study of the con-
tradictions inherent to capitalism. These contradictions, discovered by Karl 
Marx, have been extensively analysed by David Harvey (2014). This perspec-
tive helps to integrate a global dimension into how the welfare state is concep-
tualised because the contradictions of capital are not only the product of state 
interrelations, but also reflect the interaction of market and society at the do-
mestic and supra-national level. With the development of capital as a transna-
tional force and its concentration in the English-speaking 'heartland', the geo-
political struggle for primacy within this Anglosphere, has transformed to 
a rivalry between the 'heartland' and the broader West, such as France and 
Germany, and later to the confrontation between new contenders (China, Rus-
sia, Iran, and the like) and the extended 'heartland', which comprises former 
contenders (Van der Pijl 2006).
The presentation of modern world history as a systemic 'contender-heart-
land' rivalry lets us define the 'transnational space', which is 'while external to 
each of the taken states separately, is internal to the heartland as a broader 
configuration' (Van der Pijl 2006: 13). Placed within this transnational context, 
we can understand the welfare state as the 'product of the logic of capitalist 
development', which transcends the explanation, wrongly attributed to Marx, 
of the origins of the welfare state as the result of class conflict alone (Pradella 
2016). International aspects of Marx’s theory of value see the world market 
with its expansionist tendencies for capital accumulation as logically primary 
to domestic political and socio-economic developments. This logic opens up 
the opportunity of positioning the welfare state in the global dimension as 
helping to achieve (a) the reproduction of the labour force with the necessity of 
increased exploitation in the drive for profit, (b) steady demand in support of 
capitalist economic cycles, and (c) the appeasement of mass discontent by crea‑
ting entitlements to social benefits (Alber 1988 a: 182).
The article distinguishes five historical stages in the transformation of the 
welfare state: 'take off', 'expansion', 'acceleration', 'neoliberal restructuring'; 
and 'contraction'. The contradictions of capital, as outlined by Harvey, will be 
assigned to the period in which they have most affected welfare state reform; 
none of the 'foundational' contradictions1, however, can be fully assigned to a 
particular period, as they all are inherent to the capitalist system. The author’s 
contribution is to offer a chronology of the contradictions of the welfare state 
in order to show how the welfare state has evolved in response to the para-
doxes of capital, developing contradictions of its own.
1 Harvey distinguished three types of contradictions of capital: 'foundational', which are inseparable 
from the essence of capital; 'moving', which are 'dynamic forces' behind capital’s evolution; and 
'dangerous', which are threatening to the capitalist system and human existence.
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The 'take-off' of the welfare state (1880–1914)
In pre-capitalist societies, church and family were the main welfare providers, 
whilst state social policy was typically 'negative', focusing principally on the main-
tenance of public order (Alber 1988 b). The first 'take‑off' phase of the modern 
welfare state began during the Second Industrial Revolution, when capital found its 
territorial concentration in the 'Lockean heartland'. This was a turning point in his-
tory, driven by the commodification of labour as Fordism emerged as a method of 
mass production helped by new power-generation technologies and innovations in 
transport and communications. These shifts in production fundamentally reor-
dered social relations 'under the aegis of capital in large-scale industry' (Cox 
1987: 159). Social and demographic changes caused by industrialisation and grow-
ing dependence on wage labour created a demand for public spending and resulted 
in an increased role for the state in the maintenance of the workforce (Myles, Quad-
agno 2002: 36). The rising concentration of workers and the emergence of the trade 
union movement, occurred alongside challenging the social reproduction and the 
rapid exhaustion of the labour force. The gap between material representation and 
'the social reality it is seeking to represent' (Harvey 2014: 33) put capital accumula-
tion at further risk, undermining the logic of 'negative' social policy.
The emergence of the embryonic welfare state was a response to the 'moving' 
contradiction of 'freedom and domination', when the concern of the 'heartland' to 
protect liberty and private property was a justification for the 'imperial and neo-
colonial domination of much of the world'; it was also an adjustment to the 'decline 
in social reproduction', with the task of creating the conditions required to ensure 
the regeneration of capital (Harvey 2014: 15–65). The ideological conceptualisa-
tion of freedom and domination underwent a radical transformation from the indi-
vidualistic understanding of poverty towards a more collective interpretation of its 
causes. At the initial stage, however, state provision of welfare entitlements was 
limited in scope: the recipients were predominantly working class, excluding 
white-collar workers and selectively ascribing health, housing and education sup-
port (Alber 1988 b: 454). The maintenance of collective order remained the most 
important political target, and for many the welfare state would not offer more than 
voluntary insurance schemes. Nevertheless, the appearance of the welfare state as 
such was a challenge to hegemonic liberal interpretations of freedom and poverty. 
It was in a way a victory for what Karl Polanyi defined as 'good' freedom over 'bad' 
freedom, i. e. the freedom 'to exploit one’s fellows' to 'keep technological inventions 
from being used for public benefit' (Polanyi 2001: 256).
Welfare state expansion (1918–the 1950s)
After the First World War, the welfare state entered its 'expansive' period 
(Alber 1988 b). Worldwide imperialism and colonialism fostered further com-
modification of labour power, the privatisation of land, the suppression of 
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peasants and indigenous populations exacerbated class antagonisms and chal-
lenged social security.  'Accumulation by dispossession' (Harvey 2007 b: 35), 
unequal income distribution, the 'dubious state of the foreign balance', exces-
sive corporate exposure to financial pyramids, and poor regulation of financial 
systems (Galbraith 1954: 194–204), together led to the 1929 Wall Street Crash 
that resulted in the Great Depression in the 1930s.
The 1929 crisis was a manifestation of one of the 'foundational' contradic-
tions of 'capital as a process', when the accelerated circulation of capital genera-
ted tension between 'fixity and motion', as ownership was threatened by greater 
entitlement to fictitious assets. The breakdown of the 'self-regulating' system of 
the gold standard, the depreciation of national currencies and huge external 
payment deficits called for a prompt government reaction – a revolutionary 
change in attitudes to the significance of the role of the state in maintaining 
social welfare. Following the New Deal, Keynesianism was laid out as the 
foundation for crisis management after the WWII, the period that was later 
labelled 'embedded liberalism', as it tried to reconcile laissez-faire with state 
interventionism to safeguard domestic social objectives (Ruggie 1982).
After the Second World War, the international dimension predetermined 
the formation of the welfare state in the West. It was the beginning of the long-
est boom in the history of the capitalist system, which expanded both in 
breadth, out of labour reserves, and in depth, building upon previous techno-
logical achievements. The United States emerged as the sole hegemonic capi-
talist power, which helped to restore and unify Western Europe and Japan 
against the threatening 'contender', the Soviet bloc. The extension of the 'Lock-
ean heartland' was evolving in two dimensions: one took the form of the capi-
tal advance across the globe, another was an attempt to spread the social and 
geo-economic network from the Anglosphere to the rest of the world.
Competition on a global scale, geopolitical rivalry and global mass produc-
tion run-off unveiled two 'moving' contradictions of capital that spurred the 
expansion of the Western welfare state. The first one was between 'technology, 
work and human disposability', which revealed the standoff between value pro-
duction, on the one hand, and labour-saving technological innovation, on the 
other, which endangered a growing share of the population with no foreseeable 
employment opportunities. The second paradox was inherent to the division of 
labour, which discovered the interplay between the emotional and physical deg-
radation of the workforce, on the one hand, and gains in productivity and profit-
ability on the other (Harvey 2014: 108–147). Moreover, the increasing intensity 
of labour (Taylorism) and the promotion of mass production (Fordism) not only 
put the reproductive forces of capitalism at risk, but also enhanced economic 
divergence between states and regions and led to the appearance of what, ac-
cording to Harvey’s classification, could be called the first 'dangerous' contra-
diction: 'the revolt of human nature: universal alienation'. Employees could no 
longer supervise their working conditions: the process of labour and the object 
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of labour  'became "alien" things' (Choonara 2009: 53). The risk was that the 
discontented masses might challenge existing capitalist class hierarchy at do-
mestic and international levels. The situation worsened with the rise of the So-
viet bloc as a 'contender' to the 'heartland', which for a time represented a vivid 
alternative to the capitalist deadlock. In such a divided world, capitalism ur-
gently needed a 'class compromise' (Duménil and Lévy, 2004: 186).
The solution was found in the expansion of the welfare state, a tool of the 
'interventionist state' to provide the 'post-war settlement between capital and la-
bour' (Gough 1979: 70). With this expansion alongside mass consumption, and 
with the help of the Marshall Plan, European integration, and international insti-
tutions, such as the GATT, the IMF, NATO, the OECD, the enlarged West was 
'solidified' 'against the Soviet contender and communism' (Van der Pijl 2006: 66). 
The consolidation of the welfare state, designed upon the 'functional relationship 
between economic nationalism and market‑correcting planning' (Cox 1987: 168), 
found its ideological support in the concepts of import substitution and self-
sufficiency. The production system and the activity of transnational corpora-
tions were primarily host-country-oriented and led to the appearance of the 
'welfare-nationalist' state that maintained both national independence and the 
'essence of the liberal state as guardian of the market' (Ibid: 165).
However, the consolidation of the Western block after the Second World War 
was not a smooth process. Esping-Andersen’s differentiation between 'liberal', 
'conservative' and 'social democratic' welfare-state regimes, rooted in the different 
historical legacy of regime institutionalisation, class mobilisation and class-politi-
cal coalition structure, is an important insight that helps to specify crucial differ-
ences between welfare states (Esping‑Andersen 1990: 29). Despite structural dif-
ferences and the variety of capitalist typologies, most welfare states undertook 
de-commodifying social policies and the ratio of social expenditure grew as insu-
rance schemes were extended to white-collar workers and public programmes for 
housing, health and education expanded. Three 'silent revolutions' of the welfare 
state began evolving in most Western societies: the adherence to full employment 
with the absorption of women into the labour force, the vast extension of retirement 
programmes, and the transformation of the welfare state itself from a system of 
social provision to a 'virtual employment' generating machine (Ibid: 147–150).
The growing perception of welfare services as a fundamental element of 
citizenship rights seemed to have resolved, for the time being, the 'dangerous' 
contradiction of capital that leads to 'universal human alienation'. This turned out 
to be an illusion, however, as this was treatment more for symptoms rather than 
the disease itself. In reality, the constraints between 'freedom and domination' and 
the moral hazards of the division of labour enhanced human alienation and led the 
welfare state to develop the first fundamental contradiction of its own, between 
social welfare enhancement and social repression. This contradiction reflects the 
inconsistency between the freedom of exchange of the capitalist commodities and 
the coercive powers of the production regime (Marx 1995).
314
The Journal of Social Policy Studies 15 (2)
The second conjoined contradiction of the welfare state that emerged in 
this period was between people’s extended control over nature and reduced 
individual security. This was the outcome of the expansion of the social pro-
tection of the forces of production, exhausted in the process of the division of 
labour and the development of machinery, on one hand, and the increased in-
dividual insecurity as the result of the reduced control of workers over produc-
tion process on the other (Gough 1979: 11).
The acceleration of the welfare state (the 1960s–1975)
The welfare state entered the third stage of its development in the 1960s, 
labelled the 'acceleration' (Alber 1988 b). It was the beginning of 'post‑industri-
alism', marked by revolutions in technology, management, consumption and 
employment that transformed the global production regime (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 189). The contradiction between labour‑saving technological innovation 
and value production 'headed into more and more dangerous territory' (Harvey 
2014: 108). It questioned the rationality of the whole capitalist system, when the 
'rational decisions of individual capitalists, taken to satisfy their short-term 
interests' – such as achieving a high rate of profit immediately following 
a technological innovation – led, in the long run, to 'utterly irrational' conse-
quences for the system as a whole (Choonara 2009: 76). While the amount of 
living labour, supported by the policy of full employment, remained constant, 
the 'organic' composition of capital, in the long run, was declining, and, there-
fore, so were profits.
The competition between the Capitalist and the Communist blocks reached 
its peak in the years of the Cold War. The arms race was one of the major trig-
gers of economic development on both sides. Possibly, the high levels of US 
military expenditure played a greater role than Keynesianism in the lengthy 
West European boom (Bleaney 1985). In the late 1960s, the powerful Keynesi-
an demand-management regulatory mechanisms reached their limits – trade 
unions and large corporations continued to gain power and protect their inte-
rests amid rising prices (Myles, Quadagno 2002: 34). To maintain high social 
standards, there was an 'immediate' need for greater social spending, which 
imposed inflationary pressures upon the economy (Cox 1987: 187). Here we 
find a manifestation of the contradictions between capital and labour, which 
Harvey classified as the 'primary foundational contradiction of capital' the 
power of workers exceeded the power of capital and pushed the wage level up 
and reduced profits (Harvey 2014: 65).
This incongruity resided in the third contradiction of the welfare state: 
between social spending expansion and the shortage of social funds. Although 
increased social spending was necessary to accumulate further capital and trig-
ger new economic growth, when expansion reached its marginal level, it be-
came a constraint on the process of capital accumulation, reducing 'the quantity 
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of surplus value available for re‑investment' (Gough 1979: 14, 105), spurring 
inflation, reducing tax extraction capacity, and therefore, deteriorating availa-
ble social funds. As a result, 'embedded liberalism' started exhausting itself and 
faced economic stagflation, unemployment and fiscal crisis.
In the 1970s, the response to the crisis of overaccumulation was different 
than in the 1930s: the large-scale devaluation of capital was substituted by 
'a mix of temporal and spatial fixes' (Harvey 1990: 6). The spatial fix involved 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions to transpose capital into foreign subsidi-
aries and incorporate new territories with cheaper inputs into the global capita-
list system, thus increasing its profitability (Overbeek et al. 2012: 222). Thus, the 
Western production regime reacted to inflationary pressures with the growth of 
FDI, the deployment of global value chains in South-East Asia, facilitated by 
new competition-based, cost-efficient strategies. The growth of TNCs, howe-
ver, was not a long-term solution for economic slowdown, as the ongoing pro-
cess of accumulation continued to drive the rate of profit down.
Welfare state acceleration fed the development of capitalism, intensifying 
rather than pacifying global rivalry and competition. The internationalisation 
and concentration of the global production structure brought to the surface the 
contradiction between monopoly and competition, reiterating that both mo-
nopoly power and market competition were 'foundational rather than abbre-
vaiational' to the existence of capitalism (Harvey 2014: 40). It also exacerbated 
the tension between private property and the capitalist state, as the state’s co-
ercive regulatory power for the 'free' exercise of individual rights was on the 
rise, affecting the 'free' operation of capital in the main economic domains 
(Ibid: 133–145). At the same time, the empowerment of workers in the 1960s 
escalated the tension between 'production and realisation', as it reduced the 
capacity to maximise surplus value in production though lower labour costs. 
Real wages were diminishing, undermining effective demand. The concentra-
tion and internationalisation of industrial capital and the monopolisation of 
trade created economic disproportions that set persistent 'disparities of income 
and wealth', which in 1971 resulted in the collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates backed by gold convertibility.
In response to these contradictions, the welfare state faced a dilemma: to 
renounce its original support for full employment or be drawn into a budget 
deficit to finance deferred wages (Esping‑Andersen 1990: 187). The fourth wel-
fare state contradiction of the time was between real wages and full employment, 
as it was impossible to maintain both at a high level without pushing the welfare 
state to subsidise labour costs. Moreover, diminishing 'revenue-extraction capa-
city' could not compensate for 'rapid growing social-wage commitments', rein-
forced by rising unemployment (Ibid: 180). Growing unemployment became 
a 'fetter on the process of capital accumulation and economic growth itself' 
(Gough 1979: 14). Advanced capitalist states needed to, but could not, expand 
further. This contradiction of the welfare state could be reformulated as between 
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labour power and full employment: the stronger labour power becomes, the 
harder it is to constrain inflationary pressures and prevent the growth of unem-
ployment, as trade-unions constituted an 'obstacle to full employment mainte-
nance during prolonged economic stagnation' (Esping‑Andersen 1990: 179).
The fifth welfare state deadlock was between firm efficiency and collective 
good, which envisioned the tension between the micro-rationality of the enter-
prise – subsidising and rationalising labour – and stable economic growth – creat-
ing a public deficit. On one side, the welfare state as an 'agent of labour-market 
clearing' provided flexibility for women and seniors through its maternity and 
pension schemes, and facilitated participation by creating jobs in social services, 
such as health, education and childcare. On the other, the growing financial burden 
of the welfare state raised doubts over how to achieve the long-term target of eco-
nomic stabilisation. Thus, the 'silent revolution' of the welfare state undermined the 
micro-mechanisms of capitalist markets that it was supposed to protect.
The neoliberal restructuring of the welfare state (1975–2008)
The period of neoliberal 'restructuring' began around 1975, when a rise in 
social spending was challenged by a decrease in the average annual economic 
growth rate from 5 % from 1965 to 1973 to 2 % in 1974 (Alber 1988 a: 187). The 
economic slowdown – aggravated by the oil crisis of the 1970s – contributed to 
a continuous fall in rates of profit and revenues, undermined investment op-
portunities for technological innovation, which were needed to fuel the 'heart-
land–contender' and Atlantic-European competition spirals. Western socialist 
parties offered an alternative solution to the exhausted compromise between 
capital and labour that 'had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in 
the post‑war period' (Harvey 2007 a: 15). However, neoliberalism perceived 
their political victory over the Left as the continuation of the battle against the 
Communist threat of the Cold War period.
This socio-economic stalemate was resolved, in the first place, by tempo-
ral and spatial fixes; among the biggest ones were the incorporation of China 
(1978) and the communist states after 1989 into the global capitalist system 
(Overbeek 2012: 32). Its second resolution was found in the internationalisation 
of the monetary system: financialisation and the securitisation of assets of-
fered new profit opportunities to capital owners and strengthened their bar-
gaining power vis‑a‑vis the state and labour (Alber 1988 a: 201). The 'integral 
hegemony' of the US during the years of Bretton Woods was substituted with 
a 'new strategy of hegemonic coordination', or the 'minimal hegemony' based 
on the organisation of financial power across the globe that 'systematically 
favoured the US' (Cafruny, Ryner 2005: 8). Financial domination was rein-
forced by the imperialistic expansion of the EU and NATO, and by military 
intervention in the Middle East camouflaged by the 'promotion of democracy, 
humanitarian aid', or the 'war on terror'.
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The neoliberal counter-revolution 'superficially restored' the primacy of 
the 'heartland' in the global political economy through the 'rejection of popular 
aspirations for anything other than individual wealth' (Van der Pijl 2006: 20). 
The ideology of economic 'globalisation' combined rational expectations and 
utility maximisations with the recognition of the supreme importance of mo-
ney supply (Crotty 2009: 563). In short, neoliberalisation meant the 'financiali-
sation' of everything, which destroyed Fordism’s balance of mass production 
and mass consumption; the over-accumulation of production was no longer met 
by an appropriate real demand (Harvey 2007 b: 33). Late developments in secu-
ritisation and the shift from traditional 'originate and hold' to 'originate and 
distribute' banking business models led to what the IMF termed an 'arm’s 
length financial system' (Mizen 2008: 550). Differences between the 'real' and 
the financial reduced; surplus capital invested in production intensified compe-
tition, pushing down prices, which, along with falling profits, created a 'pecu-
liar combination' favourable for speculation (Choonara 2009: 2).
Financialisation internalised some contradictions of capital in the credit 
system and permitted capitalists to invest in new (biological and informa-
tional)  technological  innovations.  'Post‑Fordist' structural fragmentation of 
production – decomposition of global value chains, modularity, outsourcing 
and the digital revolution (the ability to codify design information in digital 
form) – rearranged the geography of world manufacturing, with each compo-
nent functioning according to its competitive advantage. Such factors as the 
'deindustrialisation of formerly unionised core industrial regions', the consoli-
dation of corporate power in the service sector and even the media – were all 
directed towards the formation of the neoliberal consensus as 'common sense' 
(Harvey 2007 a: 53).
By the 1980s demographic imbalances, ageing populations and the mobi-
lisation of women created a  'demand overload' (Alber 1988 a). Even though 
most Western countries introduced a series of 'legislative curtailments' in so-
cial programmes, social expenditures still grew faster than GDP. In other 
words, the period of restructuring did not entail an 'unrestrained further ex-
pansion nor a dismantling' of welfare state programmes (Alber 1988 a: 200), 
but increased the problem of the funding of social programmes.
In the 1990s‑2000s at  the centre of  the welfare state reforms were the 
privatisation of public services, such as education, healthcare, water and 
power supplies, and the re-commodification of the labour force (McDonald 
2014: 119). The primacy of individual responsibility as the solution to issues of 
inequality was revived, with social policies investing in individual skills and 
education rather than redistributing wealth directly (Schwartz, Seabrooke 
2008). The rise of  individual  investment  in housing markets and financial 
products created a form of residential capitalism, overlaid with unsecured per-
sonal debt. The traditional Keynesian welfare state was demolished by the rise 
of subprime mortgage markets. Social redistribution was exchanged for the 
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'asset-bubble-driven privatised' welfare state of the Third Way, which under-
mined the wage–consumption interplay (Crouch 2009).
The neoliberal developments that preceded the crisis exacerbated the ten-
sion between 'use value and exchange value', when the exchange value was no 
longer set by the actual costs of production, completely disentangling the social 
value of labour from its representation in monetary terms. Privatisation and the 
re-commodification of public assets aggravated the standoff between 'monopo-
lisation and competition'. The creation of an unemployed pool of 'low-wage 
surplus labour' threatened social reproduction. The situation was aggravated by 
two contradictions of capital that reached a global spread: that of private appro-
priation as opposed to common wealth; and that of uneven geographical deve-
lopment and the production of space. The response of the welfare state to these 
contradictions of capital was the financialisation of social policy.
In the period of credit expansion, the creation of an underemployed pool of 
cheap labour provoked counter-inflationary policies that deepened unemploy-
ment and increased financial pressures on social services. The welfare state de-
veloped the sixth contradiction between a 'pool of cheap labour power and finan-
cial leverage of wealth funds'; the welfare state could no longer maintain the 
unemployed without increasing financial leverage. For a time, financialisation 
resolved this deadlock, permitting welfare states to continue business-cycle 
management in liberal regimes, constraining unemployment in socio-democra-
tic regimes and enacting moderate austerity that 'promoted dis-employment of 
older workers' in conservative regimes (Esping‑Andersen 1990: 180). In other 
words, it enabled the welfare state to 'absorb costs for which it was not finan-
cially equipped' (Ibid). The social impact of financialisation was the transfer of 
power from traditional capitalist classes to key global financial centres, nour-
ished by global disparities and uneven geographical development, which eventu-
ally led to the global financial crisis.
The welfare state after the financial crisis of 2008
The financial crisis of 2008 'was not an outcome of the stagnation of the 
purchasing power of wage-earners', but rather a result of asymmetric income 
distribution and the long-term problems with over-accumulation and profitabi-
lity (Duménil, Lévy 2011: 5–13). Despite reciprocal recognition of regulatory 
flaws and the imperfections of global governance (the deregulation of the finan-
cial sector), the causes of the crisis were much deeper: global imbalances, rising 
inequality, genuine uncertainty and technological progress. Once again capital 
entered the 'dangerous' zone: the first contradiction was the 'endless compound 
growth' when capital’s ability to rely on demographic growth was diminishing 
(Harvey 2014: 242). The next one was what Harvey calls  'capital’s relation to 
nature', when capitalism damages its most critical inputs, such as labour power 
and the environmental basis. These developments awaited a reaction from the 
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welfare state. For a time, it felt as if the crisis was postponing the effects of the 
'dangerous' contradictions and had reversed neoliberal policies, with growing 
public discontent towards privatised welfare services that failed to fulfil their 
societal functions. In the search for alternatives to privatisation, various non-
state actors, such as NGOs, community groups, labour unions and faith-based 
establishments, demanded a greater role in public services and welfare provi-
sion (McDonald 2014: 120). As a result, a complex network of public provision 
appeared, in partnership with non-state partners, such as public–private part-
nerships (PPPs), NGOs, not‑for‑profit community agencies and profit‑oriented 
public–public partnerships (PUPs).
The financial crisis raised questions about whether social democracy 
could be revived (Ryner 2010: 554). The state–private form of social provision, 
however, symbolised another victory for the neoliberal doctrine over Keynesi-
anism in the instalment of the welfare state. In 2010, the seemingly formidable 
effectiveness of European welfare states in mitigating the bitter effects of the 
crisis was undermined by 'structural adjustment' to austerity measures in pub-
lic social policies (Hermann 2014). The need for austerity was dictated by 
growing fiscal deficits, augmented by the rescue programmes of finance capi-
tal in the aftermath of the crisis. The welfare state 'became a major target of 
budget consolidation' (Ibid: 201). Since then, the increasing concern among the 
population has been about 'corporatised' state-owned and state-operated social 
services, which have been 'increasingly run on commercial principles that 
mimic the private sector' (Ibid: 121).
The Global Recession was the result of the 'unleashed' hegemony of the US, 
with its 'impressive capacity to convert debt into sustainable capital accumulation 
and growth', privileges in utilising seigniorage, capitalised security markets and 
the residual welfare state, to which European social democracy offered few alter-
natives (Ryner 2010: 559). The EU relaunched integration, labelled 'embedded 
neoliberalism' (Joseph 2013), aimed at adjusting neomercantilism and socio‑
democratic logics to the primacy of the neoliberal objective. The process was 
stuck in the asymmetry of European governance: the 'Lisbon strategy' of the EU 
represented the interests of powerful transnational political forces that support the 
tactics of re-commodification, therefore failing to balance between social cohe-
sion and European competitiveness (Van Apeldoorn, Hagerb 2010: 209). The US 
remained at the top of the global hierarchy, trying to protect the position of US-
based capital, which needed that protection more than ever. Economic growth in 
all industrial countries within the heartland-contender division was stagnating or 
recovering too slowly to create employment. The sustainability of new 'contender' 
states, such as Russia and Iran, was increasingly challenged by the inherent insta-
bility of the international financial system and by limited access to global capital 
markets as the result of economic sanctions. The political fragility within the 
Western capitalist cluster was exacerbated by the crisis in the Eurozone. Despite 
internal competition in the 'heartland', and regardless of the economic turmoil in 
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Europe, the adherence of Western capitalist states to neoliberal policies made 
them resistant to the pressures for welfare state structural reforms. As a result, the 
welfare state’s reaction to the underlying contradictions of capital was limited to 
a cosmetic 'social investment model', based on 'employment activation' strategies 
and 'flexicurity' – a model for enhancing both flexibility and security in the la-
bour market (Diamond, Lodge 2014: 37).
At present, Western welfare states demonstrate 'resistance to change' in terms 
of reconciling 'embedded neoliberalism' with social risks, such as negative demog-
raphy, structural changes in labour markets, family instability and gender inequa-
lity (Ibid: 37). 'Austerity', which entails the cutting of welfare spending, remains 
one of the most important instruments of class power restoration by setting the 
'conditions of profitable accumulation' and labour market deregulation (Pradella 
2016). The promotion of fiscal discipline holds priority over social protection. Cuts 
in social spending, especially in healthcare and education, are particularly severe 
in countries hit hardest by the crisis, such as Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Poverty, 
social exclusion and rising inequality are the results of welfare state retrenchment. 
Furthermore, the neoliberal response to the crisis has reinforced the 'wrong way' 
of redistribution, with banks becoming not only too big to fail but also 'too politi-
cally powerful to be constrained' (Stiglitz 2010: 38–40). Harvey’s contradiction of 
income and wealth disparities has revealed the seventh inconsistency of the wel-
fare state: between employment and income security. As such, bitter material 
deprivation among the toiling population endangers the entire system of employ-
ment as a security net against poverty and questions the ability of the European 
Social Model to serve as an income safety cushion after the crisis (Hermann 2014). 
Moreover, the impoverishment of the employed challenge crucial inverse func-
tions of the welfare state: the reproduction of labour power and the maintenance of 
the non‑working population (the eighth contradiction).
Conclusion
The theoretical value of the contradictions of capital, discovered by Karl 
Marx, has become 'more relevant today than in the mid-to-late nineteenth cen-
tury' (Jessop 2012: 92). The demand for the advancement of historical materialist 
settings in theorising the welfare state is dictated by the latest developments in 
modern capitalist societies, which seem to be encountering political and the 
transnational over the national in the theoretical visualisation of the history of 
humankind. This makes Marx’s legacy alive to this day, reconstructed and up-
dated by Gramsci, developed and extended by Van de Pijl, further augmented 
and generalised by Harvey. It has been suggested that research on the welfare 
state should begin with the analysis of the contradictions inherent to capitalism 
by placing each studied society in a geopolitical context. In support of this argu-
ment, this article has pioneered in connecting the contradictions of capital to the 
contradictions of the welfare state, focusing on the five main periods of welfare 
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state evolution in western capitalist societies. With the aid of this correlation, 
what is demonstrated is how and why Keynesian demand-management, univer-
salism and de-commodification, which are aimed at social welfare enhancement, 
in fact result in social repression. This repressive mechanism of social control is 
reinforced by the fact that people’s ability to balance the contradictory nature of 
capitalism is illusory and actually increases personal insecurity. The acceleration 
of welfare state programs that followed, with its further de-commodification and 
the empowerment of trade unions, led to a growing political, economic and so-
cial dependence on the welfare state, to the shortage of social funds, to the de-
cline of real wages, to the rise of unemployment and, ultimately, to the destruc-
tion of the 'class compromise'. The demolition of the Keynesian welfare state and 
the privatisation and financialisation of private services has succeeded in defer-
ring rather than resolving the contradictions of the welfare state. Moreover, new 
'dangerous' contradictions have emerged as a result of neoliberal policies threate-
ning labour power reproduction and income security.
In summary, by underlining the contradictions of capitalism it is possible to 
better understand the dynamics of modern social policies, and by discovering the 
contradictions of the welfare state – to better understand why these policies do not 
often meet public expectations. The study thus suggests more generally that the 
welfare state should be expanded further by adding a global dimension to its con-
ceptualisation. This will not only contribute to the comparative studies of Euro-
pean welfare regimes but will also open up the possibility of developing a Com-
parative Welfare Studies of non-western capitalist states. Future research should 
widen the analytic coverage beyond the cases of western welfare state regimes 
considered in this article, to the modern 'contender' states, such as China or Rus-
sia. In this regard, further work should examine the possibility of an inclusion of 
the international component in the concept of the welfare state, along with the 
consideration of the state’s position in global systems as a parameter of the insti-
tutional structure. Advanced conceptualisation of the welfare state regime within 
a transnational framework will contribute to multidisciplinary studies of western 
and non-western societies and will make it possible to transgress the split between 
welfare state comparative studies and international political economy.
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